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Abstract: The relations between nationalism and religiosity are complex. Although many previous 
studies consider religion as a precursor of nationalism, Mitchell (2006) shows that in some contexts 
the relationship is a reciprocal one. The present approach focuses on the connection between nation-
alism and Christian religiosity in European countries. People who experience rapid social changes are 
more likely to reinforce their national identity by searching for stability and a new definition of self and 
of their own identity. Religion can provide content to the reinforced national identity, especially in the 
context of religious monopoly resulting in the formation of larger groups that have higher potential for 
political mobilization and are more likely to control more resources especially when they are supported 
by the state. The article uses survey data provided by European Values Survey (2000 wave) for the 
Christian population of 30 European societies. Multilevel regression analysis was used for the analy-
sis. The results indicate a positive effect of nationalist ideology on religiosity in countries with higher 
level of religious concentration, but no special impact of nationalist ideology on religion was found in 
post-communist countries. 
Introduction 
An external observer can easily notice the overlap between nationalism and religion in conflicts that 
have occurred in European countries in the last decades. In former Yugoslavia, Catholic Croats fought 
against Orthodox Serbs and both fought against the Muslim Bosnians. In Northern Ireland, Catholic 
Irish are in conflict with Protestants. Fox (2004) goes beyond European borders and emphasizes the 
increased occurrence of religion in ethnic conflicts in the last decades of the twentieth century. The 
relationship between religion and nationalism are more complex and difficult to reduce to a simple 
determinism. Many answers give priority to nationalism, considering religion as one factor that gen-
erates and reinforces the national identity (Smith, 1991, 1992; Merdjanova, 2000; Krunovich, 2006; 
Kurth, 2007; Safran, 2008). Mitchell (2006) shows that in many contexts the relationship is a recipro-
cal one where ‘each can stimulate the other’ (p. 1137). On the other hand, previous studies aiming at 
explaining the variation in religiosity (Pollack, 2001, 2008; Pettersson, 2006) have underlined the 
contribution of nationalist ideology. However, these studies did not investigate it using empirical 
data. 
The present approach focuses on the connection between nationalism and religiosity assuming that 
in some contexts nationalism can strengthen religiosity. This article investigates the influence of na-
tionalist ideology on religious values in the specific context of higher religious concentration and 
post-communist transition. Although most of the previous studies have approached the relationship 
using qualitative analysis or through case studies dedicated to one specific country, the current in-
vestigation employs the cross-sectional survey data provided by the European Values Survey 2000 to 
test the relation. 
In the context of rapid socio-economical transformation or perceived structural inequality, people 
may feel a high ‘ontological insecurity’ and in trying to cope with the situation join local identity-
based groups that provide a sense of security (Kinnvall, 2004). In this context, religion is a source of 
identity (Hoppenbrouwers, 2002; Krunovich, 2006; Mitchell, 2006). Therefore, religion provides con-
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tent to the reinforced national identity and consequently, the search for identity can be converted 
into a revival of religious beliefs and behaviours. 
As long as post-communist countries continue to experience a period of significant social, political, 
and economical transformation, the impact of nationalism on religiosity will remain strong in ex-
socialist states. Religious concentration can moderate the relation between national identity and 
religiosity. This study tests the effect of nationalist ideology, in the context of higher religious con-
centration and of post-communist transition on religious beliefs, using multi-level regression analysis. 
The study focuses on the Christian population from the investigated countries, approaching only the 
elements of traditional Christian religiosity. 
The first section of the article is an overview of the relation between religiosity and nationalism, ex-
plaining the effect of nationalism on religious beliefs. The second part introduces the indicators and 
the strategy used for analysis, whereas the third section is the data analysis. The final section is dedi-
cated to conclusions and to a short discussion. 
Nationalism as Predictor for Religious Beliefs and Practices 
The current approach looks to nationalism as ‘a way of constructing collective identities that arose 
alongside transformations in state power, increased long-distance economic ties, new communica-
tions and transportation capacities and new political projects’ (Calhoun, 1997: 29). According to Cal-
houn, nationalism has three dimensions: the discourse, the projects, and the evaluation. The first 
dimension refers to the production of cultural understanding that leads to the use of the idea of na-
tion as a framework for understanding the world. The second aspect is related to social movements 
and state policies aimed at promoting the interest of the collectivity known as a nation. The last 
characteristic refers to the political and cultural ideologies that establish the superiority of the na-
tion. The current approach focuses on the last dimension, assessing the effect of the nationalist ide-
ology on religiosity. 
According to Juergensmeyer (1993) a new form of nationalism has flourished in different societies 
around the world. Religious nationalism has grown in postcolonial societies and in post-communist 
states (Fox, 2008), and has been reported in the United States (Straughn and Feld, 2010). Globaliza-
tion challenges the idea of nation state and generates a higher demand for redefining local and na-
tional identity everywhere. 
In different contexts in different regions around the world, an increasing alliance between religion 
and nationalism is seen. For example, in the Soviet Union, political breakdown has led to an increase 
in religious nationalism, a situation that is observed in other post-communist states (Juergensmeyer, 
1993; Fox, 2008), even as the 9/11 events and the war in Iraq have accentuated the connection be-
tween religion and national identity in the United States (Straughn and Feld, 2010). Common in all 
the mentioned cases is the threat to national identity, and demonstrate the need to redefine what 
national identity is; that is, by creating a new border (Volkan, 1999) defined on the basis of religion. 
Religion is vital in building a nation’s identity. Barth (1969) stresses the role of frontiers in defining 
ethnic identity. The frontiers among different ethnic groups can vary from one moment to the next, 
depending on the situation and on the interaction among groups. Religion itself can be a boundary at 
a certain moment of time (Mitchell, 2006) and could lose its significance later. For instance, during 
the war in Croatia, religious practices and beliefs increased, and decreased after the end of the con-
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flict (Sekulic, Massey and Hodson, 2006). Religion was relevant as an identity marker during the war, 
but not during peace. Barth’s theory on ethnic borders can be extended to other types of identities, 
including national identity (Mihailescu, 2007). 
Religion is an identity marker that people can use as border between ‘we’ and ‘the others’ (Hop-
penbrouwers, 2002; Rieffer, 2003; Krunovich, 2006; Mitchell, 2006). In addition, religion provides an 
integrative ideology that helps in establishing moral standards, explaining the world and the exist-
ence of self and of ‘others’ (Hoppenbrouwers, 2002; Kinnvall, 2004; Mitchell, 2006). Moreover, reli-
gion is an effective facilitator for community life and for group mobilization (Mitchell, 2006; Kruno-
vich, 2006). Religious rituals, such as church attendance or pilgrimages, provide the opportunity for 
group meetings and common actions. Religious beliefs and myths provide content for the nationalist 
ideology promoting religion, or such beliefs and myths adapt depending on the needs of the group. 
In some cases, nationalist leaders borrow religious text interpreting them according to their national-
ist ideology, whereas in other cases, religious myths are interpreted on the basis of the nationalist 
ideology, such as the idea of a chosen nation and the sacralization of a national group (Smith, 2000). 
A sense of national pride and identity make religious practices and beliefs more attractive (Sekulic, 
Massey and Hodson, 2006). Based on these findings, there seems to be a significant effect of nation-
alist sentiment on the level of religious values in European countries. 
As I have pointed out before, national sentiments and national identity become relevant for religion 
in some specific social context. During rapid social transformations, individuals experience an in-
creased sense of ontological insecurity (Kinnvall, 2004), and in this search for one stable identity join 
local identity based groups. The identification with a large group, such as a nation, provides a strong-
er sense of security, as long as larger social units have higher bargaining power within society. How-
ever, not all Europeans have experienced situations that have been challenging their sense of securi-
ty and have been employing a redefinition of ethnic or national identity, during the last decades. 
There are some particular contexts that have necessitated a redesignation of identity and which 
made the national sentiments more relevant for the explanation of religious beliefs. 
The first relevant distinction for this topic is between countries from Western Europe and from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. The development of nationalism and national identity has followed a differ-
ent path in the two parts of Europe. For Central and Eastern Europe, religion has been a very im-
portant factor in the construction and preservation of national identity of many countries. This was 
the case for countries such as Poland or Lithuania (Bruce, 1999, 2001; Froese, 2004) and for most of 
the Orthodox countries from Eastern Europe (Frankly Lytle, 1998; Merdjanova, 2000; Leujtean, 
2007). 
In post-communist countries, the breakdown of the communist regime has increased the salience of 
national identity for religious values and behaviours. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia determined an acute need for redefining national identity, 
stimulating a new wave of nationalist movements (Calhoun, 1997). The development of religious 
nationalism in these countries has been documented (Juergensmeyer, 1993; Fox, 2008). New inde-
pendent states have emerged and they need a new national identity. Communist regimes promoted 
a secular transnational ideology that was imposed by an external conqueror, the former USSR 
(Juergensmeyer, 1993). People in the region have developed a strong religious nationalist ideology as 
a reaction to the communist past, whereas post-communist states try to protect local culture from 
the external influences (Fox, 2008). Moreover, the economic difficulties experienced during the post-
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communist transition, have increased the sense of insecurity and fuelled the search for a stable iden-
tity (Kinvall, 2004). Consequently, one may expect to find that national sentiments in post-
communist countries have a stronger impact on their religious values and practices as compared to 
that in old democratic states from Western Europe. 
A second factor that moderates the impact of nationalist ideology on religious phenomenon is reli-
gious pluralism. According to supply-side theory (economic market model), religious pluralism in-
creases religious participation (Finke and Stark, 1988; Finke, 1990; Iannaccone, 1991; Stark and 
Iannaccone, 1994; Pettersson, 2006). A pluralist and a free market of religious goods stimulate reli-
gious institutions to expand their offers. Thus, each person can find something that corresponds to 
his or her spiritual motivations. Whereas the American context is a pluralist one, in many European 
countries the main religious denomination monopolizes the religious market (Finke and Stark, 1988; 
Iannaccone, 1991; Hamber and Petterson, 1994; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994). Halman and Draulans 
(2004) show that in Europe, ‘religious pluralism correlates with a lower degree of religiosity and par-
ticipation in religious services’ (p. 313), whereas Chaves and Gorski (2001) point out that the signifi-
cance of pluralism for religious participation depends on the type of religious competition. According 
to Chaves and Gorski (2001), religious pluralism is important if the religious participation is a volun-
tary one; religious organizations being rather voluntary associations compete with other types of 
associations for acquiring the time and resources of an individual, like in American case. If the reli-
gious membership is more like modern citizenship, such as in the European context, religion be-
comes intertwined with political, social, and cultural conflict (Chaves and Gorski, 2001: 278). In such 
settings, religious competition overlaps with the struggle for political and economic power; where 
larger groups are more likely to control more resources and gain more members. 
Starting from the theory of group threat, Krunovich (2006) finds a negative impact of religious diver-
sity on the salience of Christian religion for national identity. However, according to Blalock (1967), 
larger groups have higher potential for political mobilization, resulting in being perceived as a threat 
by the dominant group. Small religious groups may be less of a threat for the religious majority be-
cause they do not represent a real challenge in the competition for resources. Based on the same 
argument, one can assume that religious pluralism generates relatively small religious minorities that 
do not pose any threat for each other and for national identity. 
The inseparable fusion of religion and nationalism tends to occur in a territory that has a homoge-
nous religious population, because possessing a particular territory or being connected to it are two 
very important factors for the nationalist claims (Rieffer, 2003). The religious concentration in an 
area will reinforce the impact of nationalism on religiosity. This is the case in some European coun-
tries with very high religious concentration in which nationalist ideology has fuelled religion in coun-
tries such as Poland, Ireland, Romania, Croatia, Slovakia, or Lithuania (Bruce, 1996; Martin, 2005). 
These countries represent religious monopoly, more than 80 per cent belonging to the main religious 
denomination, and state strongly supports the main denomination. The Government Favoritism of 
Religion Index in these countries varies from 5.8 in Poland to 7.8 (Religion and State Project1). The 
high values indicate that states protect religious denomination which is related to national identity. 
Consequently it is likely to find a positive effect of nationalist ideology on religious participation in 
countries with a higher level of religious concentration. 
Research has shown that both micro and macro level factors influence religious participation. These 
include: age, older people being more religious than younger ones (Hout and Greeley, 1987; Gautier, 
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1997; Argue et al, 1999; Becker and Hofmeister, 2001) or sex, women displaying higher level of reli-
gious participation (Nelsen, 1981). On the other hand, cohorts socialized in a secular environment are 
more likely to be less religious (Hout and Greeley, 1987; Halman and Draulans, 2004). In addition, the 
positioning on the labor market (De Vaus and MacAllister, 1987), education (Johnson, 1997; Yucht-
man-Yaar and Alkalay, 2007), and personal income (Iannaccone, 1990; Iannaccone and Everton, 
2004) seem to affect religious involvement. Less religious are employees, as are the more educated 
people and people with higher income. Religious participation varies depending on the religious de-
nomination. Catholic affiliated persons are more religious oriented (Halman and Draulans, 2004). In 
terms of values orientation, post-materialism is associated with a lower level of traditional religiosity 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2004). 
Research has emphasized the effect of some macro level variables on religious involvement. Accord-
ing to the secularization theory, the more socio-economically developed a country is, the lower the 
level of religiosity as proved by empirical studies (Pollack, 2003, 2008; Halman and Draulans, 2004; 
Inglehart and Norris, 2004; Petterssson, 2006; Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay, 2007). The supply-side 
theory is a more controversial one; some empirical studies support it (Pettersson, 2006), whereas 
others invalidate it (Halman and Draulans, 2004; Pollack, 2008). The religious tradition of countries 
appears to be relevant, people living in Catholic countries being more religious than the Orthodox, 
which are in turn more religious than Protestants (Halman and Draulans, 2004; Yuchtman-Yaar and 
Alkalay, 2007). Moreover, state support for religion and the level  of democratization are relevant 
predictors of the general level of religiosity and religious practice in a society (Fox, 2008). 
Controlling for factors that prove to influence the individual’s level of religious beliefs, the following 
hypotheses are tested using empirical data: 
(H1) The national ideology exerts a significant positive effect on religious values. 
(H2) The effect of national ideology on religious values is stronger in post-communist countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
(H3) The effect of national ideology on religious beliefs is greater in countries with lower level of reli-
gious pluralism. 
Data, Measurement, and Methods 
The analysis is based on data from the third wave of European Values Survey (EVS), carried out in 
1999/ 2000 in countries from all the European regions. The questionnaire provides information on 
attitudes and values orientations on a wide range of life domains, including nationalist ideology and 
religion. Other information regarding social background variables are also available. The following 
countries are included in the present analysis (with the number of cases for each country): Austria 
(1485), Belgium (1912), Belarus (1000), Bulgaria (1000), Croatia (1008), Czech Republic (1908), Den-
mark (1018), Estonia (1005), Finland (1038), France (1615), Germany (2036), Great Britain (1000), 
Greece (1142), Hungary (1000), Iceland (967), Ireland (1012), Italy (2000), Latvia (1012), Lithuania 
(1018), Luxembourg (1017), Netherlands (1004), Poland (1095), Portugal (1000), Romania (1139), 
Russia (2000), Slovakia (1331), Slovenia (1006), Spain (1200), Sweden (1015), and Ukraine (1195). All 
the national samples are probability samples.2 The data were made available by ASEP/JDS and ZA, 
Cologne, Germany.3 The macro-level indicators used in the analyses come from the CIA World-
factbook 2004 and the United Nation Statistics Division. 
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Several multilevel regression models were generated using the HLM 6.04 program for Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling. The multi-level regression tests the combined effect of both individual independent 
variable and country level variables, controlling for the interactions between the individual and coun-
try characteristics. In addition, multi-level regression can account for the level of variance that can be 
attributed to individual characteristics and how much can be attributed to the contextual/group level 
features. The first model run is a model without explanatory variables and indicates the amount of 
variance allotted to the individual traits and the variance existing at the group level. The second re-
gression includes only the individual level predictors, but excludes the variable measuring nationalist 
ideology. The third model comprises only individual level independent variables, including the indica-
tor for nationalist ideological orientation, aiming at assessing the effect of nationalist ideology on the 
outcome variable. The fourth model contains both individual and country independent variables. The 
last model adds the effect of the two interactions between individual and country level independent 
variables. In all models, list wise deletion of missing values has been employed. As the country sam-
ples have different sizes, a weight variable has been used in all individual-level analyses so that all 
samples have the same size (N=1000). The multi-collinearity among the independent variables, both 
individual and contextual ones, was tested using Tolerance (estimated in SPSS 15), for all the indica-
tors the level of Tolerance above 0.6. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable is religiosity that taps the latent dimension of religious belief. The measure-
ment’s invariance of the latent dimension, across all countries included in the analysis, was tested 
using Multi Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis in AMOS 16. The indexes of fit for each country are 
presented in the Appendix Table Al.  
The index of religiosity is constructed as a factorial score and it explains the variation of variables 
connected to the importance of religion in personal life, to the importance of God in personal life, to 
the trust in the intervention of the Church in social matters, and to the belief in certain religious ide-
as. The importance of religion in personal life is asked as How important is religion in your life. The 
given answers are recorded on a scale of four levels. The importance of God is asked in the item How 
important is God in your life. The answers are given on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means unim-
portant and 10 very important. The trust in the social implication of the Church represents a summa-
tive score built from the affirmative answers to the following questions: In general, do you believe 
the Church to offer the right answers to the individuals’ moral problems and needs/Problems of 
family life/Spiritual needs of people/ Social problems of the country. The score ranges from 0 to 4, 
where 4 indicates maximal acceptance of the social implication of the church. The belief in religious 
ideas is also constructed as a summative score out of affirmative answers to the following questions: 
Do you believe that there is a God or not/Life after death/Hell/Heaven/Sin. The values of the score 
rank from 0 to 5, 5 showing maximal acceptance of traditional religious beliefs. In essence, it is religi-
osity that influences the way in which an individual answers these questions. For instance, a high 
score of the religiosity variable indicates a high level of religiousness, whereas a low value indicates 
orientation toward secu-larization. The index presented in Figure 1 shows that the model fits the 
data. It must be mentioned that the indicator has been rescaled and it takes values from 0 to 10 
where 0 stands for the absence of religious belief and 100 is a maximal religious value orientation. 
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Independent Variables: Individual Level 
Adherence to nationalist ideology is framed in the question: ‘How proud are you to be [country] citi-
zen?’ The answers were recoded so that the higher the score is, the higher the adherence to the na-
tionalist ideology. The four answers categories are: not at all proud, not very proud, quite proud, and 
very proud. For measuring the post-materialist values orientation, the classical scale of materialism 
was computed (Inglehart 1997) and a dummy variable was built, taking the value of 1 if the respond-
ent was classified as post-materialist. 
Other control variables used in the model are: age, education, income, employment, gender, reli-
gious socialization during childhood, and religious affiliation. Age is measured in years, whereas edu-
cation is estimated by the age to complete full-time education. For income, the data set provide the 
income deciles at the individual level, representing a relative measure as compared to the respective 
society. Gender is tapped by a dummy variable, which take the value of 1 for female respondents. 
Employment status is tapped by a dummy variable, indicating if the respondent is active in the labour 
market (either working as employed or self-employed). Religious socialization during childhood indi-
cates if the respondent was attending church at least once a month when she or he was 12-years old. 
Religious affiliation indicates the respondent’s belonging to Catholic or Protestant denomination 
(dummy variable), Orthodox denomination being the reference category. 
Independent Variables: Country Level 
The level of socio-economic development is tapped by Human Development Index (HDI 2001) com-
puted by United Nations. Percent of Catholic in the country captures the effect of country’s religious 
tradition, whereas a dummy variable indicates the country’s affiliation to post-communist group. 
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Religious concentration was tapped by Herfindahl- Hirschman Index, which represents a widely used 
measure in the sociology of religion, investigating the degree of monopoly on the religious market 
(Halman and Draulans 2004; Inglehart and Norris 
2004). The index is based on the formula 
 representing the percentage of a 
religious group out of the total population. When 
the market is a monopoly situation, the index 
takes a value close to 1000, whereas when the 
market is shared by numerous denominations, 
the value decreases. Small values of the index 
show the existence of a pluralism situation, 
whereas high values indicate the existence of 
monopoly. In the current analysis, the index was 
divided by 100 to facilitate the interpretation of 
the results. Data about religious denominations 
in each country are provided by CIA Worldfact 
book 2004. Because of the multi-collinearity be-
tween religious concentration and state support for religion, the current analysis does not control for 
the effect of state support for religion on dependent variable.4 Descriptive statistics for individual 
and country level variables are shown in Table 1. 
 
Results 
The data indicates a higher variation in the level 
of religiosity across Europe (Table 2). The results 
confirm the findings of previous researches (Hal-
man and Draulans, 2004; Froese, 2005; Halman 
and Pettersson, 2006; Pollack, 2008), indicating 
an advancement in secularization in Nordic coun-
tries (Sweden and Denmark), in Estonia, and 
Czech Republic and an increasing religiosity in 
Malta, Romania, Poland, Ireland, and Italy. There-
fore, religiosity is still high in Catholic countries, 
as well as in Romania, which being an Orthodox 
country is an exception. 
The bivariate analyses indicate a strong correla-
tion between nationalism and religiosity (Table 
3). Moreover, the association between national-
ism and religious value is the strongest as 
pared to the connection between the outcome 
variable and the other independent variables. All 
the other variables, both individual and contex-
tual ones, have the predicted effect on the de-
pendent variable, the older, less educated, and 
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poorer people being more religious. At the contextual level, the data supports the assertion that 
religious concentration is associated with higher levels of religiosity in European countries. The same 
relation is valid for the percent of Catholics in a popu-
lation, whereas the level of social development oper-
ates in the opposite direction. However, the relations 
change when simultaneously controlling for the effect 
of all the predictors on the outcome variable. 
I have run a set of multilevel regression models to test 
the research’s hypotheses. The first model (not 
shown) does not include explanatory variables, but 
indicates the amount of variance allotted to the indi-
vidual level and to the contextual one. The variance 
among countries (r0o = 0.188) is lower than the variance among the individuals within countries (a2 = 
0.669). However, the Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC = 0.22) indicates that ~ 22% of the varia-
tion of religiosity is among countries. Moreover, the /2 test for between countries variance compo-
nent is highly significant (x2= 10090.42, P< 0.001), indicating a high variance among the countries. 
Consequently, I can use multilevel models to explain the variation of religiosity by both individual and 
contextual variables. 
The first model (Table 4) tests the effect of individual level variables on one’s religiosity considered to 
determine the individual level of religiosity. Similar to literature, all the predictors were found to be 
highly significant, except for education that showed no significant impact. Age, religious socialization 
during childhood, being female, and belonging to Catholic or Protestant denomination have a posi-
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tive effect on religiosity, whereas high income, being employed, and the post-materialist value orien-
tation have a negative impact on religiosity. This model explains 0.334 variance at the individual level 
and 0.592 at the contextual level. The individual predictors account for the country-level variance, 
indicating that the social composition of the population included in the study significantly differs with 
respect to individual-level explanatory variables. 
The second model contains individual predictors too, but this time nationalism was included as an 
independent variable. Nationalism was found to increase individual religiosity. This finding validates 
the first hypothesis. The relation between the dependent variable and other predictors does not 
change, the set of significant individual independent variables remain the same. The amount of vari-
ance explained at the individual level has only slightly increased. However, the deviance, which indi-
cates how well the model fits the data, has significantly decreased (the difference being 4634) in 
model 2. According to Hox (2002), the models with lower level of deviance better fits the data as 
compared to models with higher deviance. This indicates a better fit for the model that includes na-
tionalism among the predictors. 
The third model explains how contextual-level variables relate to religiosity, keeping the effect of 
individual predictors constant. All the country-level variables are highly significant for the variation of 
religiosity, excepting the percent of Catholic population. Religious concentration increases the level 
of religiosity, whereas being a post-communist country and the level of socioeconomic development 
have the opposite outcome (Table 4). The data support the secularization theory and reject the sup-
ply-side approach. It seems that in Europe, a reduced number of religious participation. All the ef-
fects of the individual-level inde-pendent variables remain the same when controlling for the contex-
tual predictors. Note that the explained variance on the contextual level increases significantly for 
the third whereas the variance explained on the individual level has marginally risen. 
The last model tests the effect of nationalism on religiosity in different contexts. The effects of con-
textual predictors on the outcome variable remain unchanged, whereas the relation between na-
tionalism and religiosity changes at the individual level. Therefore, nationalism per se has no signifi-
cant effect on religiosity. However, the results indicate a strong and significant effect of nationalism 
on religiosity in the context of higher religious concentration, validating the third hypothesis. The 
nationalist ideology determines the level of religiosity only in societies characterized by a higher reli-
gious concentration. The data does not support the second hypothesis, nationalism not being a sig-
nificant predictor for religiosity in post-communist countries. 
Conclusions 
This article investigates the relationship between nationalism and religious believes, on Christian 
population of 30 European countries, controlling for the contextual factors such as religious concen-
tration and being a post-communist country. Several significant conclusions arise from the analysis. 
The results partially confirm the hypotheses. The impact of nationalism on religious values was 
demonstrated in countries where there is high religious concentration. Nationalist ideology affects 
religious beliefs only where there exists a dominant religion. This finding contradicts the economic 
market model, indicating that in European societies, religious concentration results in people being 
religious. A higher religious concentration means a reduced number of groups competing in the reli-
gious market and a strong state control. As the state is likely to protect those religious groups that 
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support the alliance between religion and national identity, the effect of nationalism is stronger in 
these states than in pluralist societies. 
The results indicate a lower level of religiosity in post-communist countries, proving the efficiency of 
‘forced secularization’ imposed by the communist regimes. One should note that the effect of these 
policies remains stronger after a decade of religious revival reported in the region (Inglehart and 
Norris 2004; Pollack 2004; Froese 2005). However, the results of the present analysis refer only to 
the traditional Christian religiosity, whereas in post-Soviet societies the religious revival mainly oc-
curred rather in relation with religious syncretism than with traditional religion. The effect of reli-
gious pluralism on non-traditional religious orientations is an interesting direction for future studies. 
Moreover, additional attention may be given to the relation between nationalism and non-traditional 
religious beliefs. The data does not support the predicted effect of nationalism on religiosity in post-
communist countries. It seems that the nationalist revival post-Cold War in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope was not the result of a particular alliance between national ideals and religions. 
What do we learn from the paper? The results indicate that the coalition between the nationalist 
ideology and the religion mainly occurred because stronger ethnic groups competed over the re-
sources and found in religion a strong ally helping them to define their boundaries, for example, in 
countries such as those from ex-Yugoslavia. The congruence between ethnic frontier and the reli-
gious one increases the involvement of nationalist adherents to religion. Thanks to the fact that 
many members of the same ethnic group share the same religious orientation and because of the 
higher level of religious concentration, religion becomes a useful tool for the nationalist ideology. 
The same is valid for Northern Ireland, as Mitchell pointed out (2006). The 
Croatian experience indicates that religiosity decreases when its relevance for the nationalist move-
ment diminishes (Sekulic, Massey and Hodson, 2006). 
The results of the present investigation are limited to the Christian population of the countries under 
investigation and by the cross-sectional data used to test the hypotheses. Therefore, they cannot be 
generalized in other religious contexts. The causal relationship between religiosity and nationalist 
ideology cannot be adequately tested because of the cross-sectional data. Longitudinal studies may 
be undertaken to examine how the relationships between nationalist ideology and religiosity are 
shaped by larger social context. Future investigations may consider the Muslim population from Eu-
ropean countries, as well as repeated survey data. Consequently, they would allow to gain deeper 
insights on the relationship between religion and nationalism and to extend the results for other 
religious groups. 
Notes 
1. See www.religionandstate.org. 
2. For more information about EVS see EVS’s homepage: www.europeanvalues.nl and Halman 
(2001). 
3. European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 
2006. The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association. Aggregate File 
Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain/Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. Aggregate File Dis-
tributors: ASEP/JDS and ZA, Cologne, Germany. 
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4. The reduced number of cases in the second level of analysis does not allow controlling for 
other country level predictors. 
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